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Summary 
Over a decade ago the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Aboriginal Affairs and the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
concluded that the essence of self-determination is the devolution of political and 
economic power to Indigenous communities. Self-determination was defined to 
mean Indigenous people having control over the ultimate decisions about a wide 
range of matters including political status, and economic, social and cultural 
development, and having the resources and capacity to control the future of their 
own communities within the legal structure common to all Australians. 
This paper proposes that the concept of jurisdictional devolution could provide a 
key framework for the practical implementation of self-determination at the 
community level for Indigenous Australians, and proceeds to examine the nature 
of the concept, its application, and the challenges and opportunities it presents. It 
argues that the concept of jurisdictional devolution can be used as an organising 
perspective or frame of reference. This enables us to develop a policy-relevant 
language with which to discuss the implementation of local-level self-
determination, and connects theoretical propositions about inherent rights to 
self-determination, and the practice of achieving it in a workable form.  
The paper begins by developing an operational definition for the term 
‘jurisdictional devolution’. It then considers the question: why devolve? What are 
the imperatives for jurisdictional devolution, the likely advantages and benefits? 
The discussion focuses on practical design and implementation by examining the 
lessons that can be drawn from two case studies of devolution in the arena of 
welfare. The first is from the United States of America, where a process of welfare 
devolution to Native American Indian Tribes is in the early stages of 
implementation. The object of this case study is to extrapolate lessons and 
insights that can be applied to the design and implementation of a relevant 
Australian model. The second case study presents a preliminary proposal, 
developed by a central Australian community, for the future devolution of 
particular components of welfare jurisdiction. 
Against the backdrop of that broad comparative perspective, the paper proceeds 
to consider the factors that will be relevant in Australia for constructing a 
framework for jurisdictional devolution. A key issue is what might constitute the 
most effective and relevant Indigenous boundaries and units for devolution. To 
whom or what would jurisdiction be devolved? In other words, who constitutes 
the ‘self’ in self-determination? A ‘geography of devolution’ is proposed in the form 
of a flexible aggregation model—regionally dispersed, layered community 
governance—which has both community and regional elements. 
The paper concludes by drawing together these lessons, limitations and practical 
options in order to highlight the operating principles and types of strategic action 
that would need to inform the design and implementation of a workable 
framework for jurisdictional devolution in Australia. 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 233 vii 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Acknowledgments 
The consideration of issues in this paper has greatly benefited from discussions 
at different times with Stephen Cornell, Sarah Hicks, Neil Sterritt and Neil 
Westbury, and from the comments of participants at the Centre for Aboriginal 
Economic Policy Research seminar series on ‘Indigenous Governance: Issues, 
Models and Options for the Future’, convened by myself and Dr Will Sanders over 
three months in 2002 at the Australian National University. I would also like to 
thank Bill Arthur and Patrick Sullivan for their particularly helpful comments on 
a draft of this paper. My appreciation also goes to Frances Morphy who provided 
invaluable editorial input and assisted with the layout, and to Sally Ward  
for proofreading. 
viii SMITH 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 233 1 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Introduction 
In 1990, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs 
(HRSCAA) concluded in its report Our Future, Our Selves: Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Community Control, Management and Resources, that the essence 
of self-determination is ‘the devolution of political and economic power to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities’. Self-determination was 
defined to mean Aboriginal people having ‘control over the ultimate decision 
about a wide range of matters including political status, and economic, social and 
cultural development’ and ‘having the resources and capacity to control the 
future of their own communities within the legal structure common to all 
Australians’ (HRSCAA 1990: 12).  
A year later, the national report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths 
in Custody (RCIADIC) concluded ‘that the principle of self-determination is the 
appropriate basis for reform in Aboriginal affairs’ (RCIADIC 1991, Vol. 4: 19). It 
also confirmed, through its consultation process, the core principle of self-
determination as being the right of Indigenous people to make choices among the 
spectrum of possibilities for self-determination within the ambit of the Australian 
legal system.  
Describing self-determination as an ‘evolving concept’, the RCIADIC posed the 
critical question of how such control could be secured. It responded by 
significantly building upon the HRSCAA report, attempting to set a future 
direction for achieving self-determination. In particular, it recommended that:  
• Federal, State and Territory Governments introduce triennial block grant 
funding for Indigenous organisations, giving communities  
• ‘the greatest freedom possible to decide for themselves the areas on which the 
funds would be spent’, and that  
• ‘wherever possible this funding be allocated through a single source with one 
set of audit and financial requirements but with the maximum devolution of 
power to communities and organisations to determine the priorities for the 
allocation of such funds’ (RCIADIC 1991, Vol. 4: 21).  
The RCIADIC further argued that such a process of devolution would have  
to involve Indigenous Australians at the level of policy design as well as  
service delivery. 
In the decade since the HRSCAA and RCIADIC reports, debate has continued 
about how to implement Indigenous self-determination, and a number of 
subsequent government inquiries and research papers have reached similar 
conclusions.1 All these various reports have tried to grapple with the concept of 
devolution, and specifically jurisdictional devolution—whether it be in regard to 
funding arrangements, regulatory issues, functional areas of government service 
delivery, decision-making, policy formulation, or political representation.  
2 SMITH 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
This paper is exploratory. It focuses on the concept of jurisdictional devolution 
and proposes that it could provide a key framework—at both the policy and 
practical levels—for the implementation of self-determination at the community 
level for Indigenous Australians. It argues that the concept of jurisdictional 
devolution can be used as an organising perspective or frame of reference (see 
also Judge et al. 1995; Stoker 1998). It enables us to develop a policy-relevant 
language with which to discuss the implementation of local-level self-
determination, affording a connection between theoretical propositions about 
inherent rights to self-determination, and the practice of achieving it in a 
workable form on the ground. It also allows us to explore the nature and extent of 
the barriers to, and benefits of the process. And it provides a means of identifying 
the key design principles and areas of strategic action that would be required to 
give practical effect to self-determination at the community level. 
The paper pursues these broad objectives by first developing an operational 
definition or language for the term ‘jurisdictional devolution’. It then considers the 
question: why devolve? What are the imperatives for jurisdictional devolution; the 
likely advantages or benefits? The paper then focuses on issues of practical 
design and implementation, by examining the lessons that can be drawn from two 
case studies of devolution from the arena of welfare. The first is a case study from 
the United States of America (USA) of welfare devolution to Native American 
Indian Tribes that is in the early stages of implementation. The object is not to 
suggest a straight importation of an American model; but rather to derive useful 
lessons and insights that can be taken into consideration for the design and 
implementation of an Australian model. The second case study presents a 
preliminary proposal developed by a central Australian community for the future 
devolution of particular components of welfare jurisdiction. 
Against the backdrop of that broad comparative perspective, the paper then 
proceeds to consider the factors that will be relevant for the construction of a 
framework for jurisdictional devolution in Australia. A key issue is what might 
constitute the most effective and relevant Indigenous boundaries and units for 
devolution. To whom or what would jurisdiction be devolved? In other words, who 
constitutes the ‘self’ in self-determination? A ‘geography of devolution’ is proposed 
in the form of a flexible aggregation model—regionally dispersed, layered 
community governance—which has both community and regional elements. 
The paper concludes by drawing these lessons, limitations and practical options 
together in order to highlight the operating principles and strategic action that 
would need to inform the design and implementation of a workable framework for 
jurisdictional devolution in Australia. 
Before proceeding, some caveats need to be mentioned. Firstly, the paper focuses 
on the Indigenous community level, and its potential connection to wider regional 
aggregations. Indigenous political and institutional factors at the national level 
are not a focus. These have been substantially examined in a wide variety of 
publications (see e.g. Australia Institute 2000; Sanders 2002; Sullivan 1996; and  
numerous papers, reviews and government inquiries, many of which are listed on 
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the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) web page 
[www.atsic.gov.au]). While jurisdictional devolution implies a ‘top-down’ process, 
this paper suggests that workable and relevant forms of devolution will only  
be developed by first examining the nature of needs at the local level, and  
local preferences and circumstances, and how those critically affect design  
and implementation.  
Secondly, the possibility of developing a policy-relevant framework for the 
practical implementation of self-determination is explored in the full knowledge 
that in recent years self-determination, let alone an implementation strategy, has 
been rejected as an active federal government policy position (see Dodson & 
Pritchard 1998; Sanders 2002: 2). One purported reason for rejection by 
government is that self-determination promotes separatism and a stand-alone 
form of sovereignty. Clearly, there are other interpretations of self-determination, 
including the framework of jurisdictional devolution discussed here and those put 
forward in many previous government inquiries. Despite the policy position of the 
present Federal Government, key agencies, statutory authorities and lower levels 
of government continue to promote various policy and program strategies to 
secure positive benefits from Indigenous self-determination and empowerment. 
Jurisdictional devolution: some definitional issues 
The term ‘jurisdiction’ is defined in its common-sense meaning as ‘the right, 
power, or authority to administer the law by hearing and determining 
controversies’; ‘the extent or range of judicial or other authority’; and the ‘territory 
over which authority is exercised’.2 Jurisdictional authority may be exercised over 
public institutions, territory, expenditure and revenue-raising capacities, and 
functional and policy areas such as law-making, taxation, health, housing, 
municipal services, education, economic development, social security and so on. 
Under Australian federalism, jurisdictions are multi-layered, with different kinds 
of power and authority differently distributed across levels; sometimes divided, 
sometimes overlapping and concurrent.  
When we think of ‘jurisdiction’ we must also recognise an inherently cross-
cultural element. A number of commentators argue that Aboriginal law 
constitutes an ‘original jurisdiction’. For example, Noel Pearson (1977) has 
suggested that the concept of sovereignty resided in Aboriginal law and corporate 
groups prior to British colonisation. Marcia Langton refers to the ‘ancient 
jurisdictions’ of Aboriginal polities, arguing that if, as the common law now holds, 
‘native title survives, then Aboriginal jurisdictions, that is the juridical and social 
spaces in which such laws are practices, must also survive’ (Langton 2002: 1; see 
also Reynolds 1996, 1998: 208–15). The practice of Aboriginal governance today 
is, as Langton (2002: 6) argues, indistinguishable from practices of ownership, 
and that jurisdiction is an ‘extremely localised one, elaborated across regions, but 
exercised by individuals with authority’.  
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A range of precedent-setting court cases and reports have sought to explore the 
nature of Indigenous jurisdiction, and the extent of its potential co-existence with 
the common law.3 Particular pieces of legislation have given a degree of 
recognition and protection to particular aspects of it; for example, traditional 
ownership expressed as inalienable freehold title over certain territory. But 
recognition of an Indigenous jurisdiction has been piecemeal, and its exercise 
invariably confined to the so-called ‘traditional’ domain—that is, it is generally not 
seen to include resource rights, commercial exploitation, legislative or court 
authority, control over revenue raising, or a right to self-government. 
The term devolution can be defined to mean the transference of power and 
authority over jurisdictions from a higher, central level or order of government to 
other levels or orders of government. When it occurs in the form of transferring 
broad powers over specific territory to self-governing units, it gives effect to 
sovereignty and self-government. But it may also take the form of vertical 
transfers of discrete powers over specific jurisdictions, or even over sub-
components of specific jurisdictions (e.g. transferring authority over particular 
resources or functional areas). Such transferred power may be in respect to any 
possible combination of administrative, political, financial, functional and policy 
domains. Within the system of federalism and the legal structure common to all 
Australians, ‘devolution’ is arguably a more appropriate term than 
‘decentralisation’ in talking about developing Indigenous jurisdictional authority 
as an aspect of local self-determination.  
Decentralisation is the delegation of responsibility to subordinate dispersed units 
of hierarchical jurisdiction which have primary accountability upwards to their 
superiors in the hierarchy (International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) 2001: 2). It may provide more local administrative and management 
discretion, but financial control, policy independence and decision-making power 
are not necessarily transferred or more discretionary (Whiteford 2001: 112). For 
example, transferring welfare services from a central government department to a 
community welfare office which is staffed by government officers or their local 
agents, and which is directed by central government policy and program 
objectives, is an example of decentralisation. In decentralisation, top-level 
decision-making processes are dispersed throughout the system of government 
(Arbib 1984); but jurisdictional authority is not transferred.  
The term devolution, on the other hand, describes cases where the transfer of 
responsibilities coincides with the transfer of power and capacity to legitimate, 
representative institutions. Devolution can give a practical form to corporate or 
geographic autonomy, and to the possibility of ‘internal self-government’ (Arthur 
2001: 2). It involves the creation of relatively autonomous realms of authority, 
responsibility and entitlement, together with accountability to local constituents. 
For example, transferring authority for welfare policy and program design, 
administration and implementation (either in full or in part) to a community or 
regional institution which is representative of community or regional residents, 
and is able to exercise a degree of prerogative in these areas, is an example of 
jurisdictional devolution (see also Whiteford 2001: 112).  
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There are limits to which it is possible to sustain an analytical distinction 
between the terms ‘devolution’ and ‘decentralisation’. For example, it should be 
possible to initiate a process of devolution via a series of consciously targeted 
decentralisation steps that progressively transfer delegation and authority. 
Equally, there may be a point in this continuum at which the limits of 
decentralisation as a strategy for implementing self-determination and developing 
community governance became apparent; for example, in the form of central 
government reluctance to transfer power and disrupt the existing bureaucratic 
balance of power among the units of government. 
To sum up, jurisdictional devolution is defined here as the process of power 
sharing within a common legal and governmental order.4 It results in a form of 
‘decentred diverse federalism’ where autonomy is practiced as an ‘interdependent’ 
process, in relation to other units (Havemann 1999: 472; Nedelsky 1989; Young 
2000: 238, 253). By implication, jurisdictional devolution is about the political 
economy of power-sharing, and the process of developing a system of inter-related 
jurisdictional parts. Any move along the centralised–devolved continuum can 
therefore take a range of forms with variation in jurisdictional coverage and in  
the extent of autonomy and interdependence, according to whether it is 
legislative, administrative, or both (Havemann 1999; Ivison et al. 2000; Whiteford 
2001: 112). 
Potential benefits and opportunities of devolution 
Calls for jurisdictional devolution come from a number of different quarters, for 
reasons which spring from political, cultural and economic concerns including 
cultural diversity, shared identity, heritage protection, community economic 
development, regional land and resource management, and the desire for greater 
self-determination. 
Devolution as a means to implementing self-determination 
The principle of self-determination holds that culturally distinct groups should 
have a degree of control over those economic, political, and social institutions that 
impact on their way of life. Ironically, some commentators complain it is actually 
Australia’s self-determination policy that is the current problem in Indigenous 
affairs; that it is holding Indigenous people back from socioeconomic engagement 
with the mainstream economy. But it is premature to declare self-determination 
as being past its ‘use-by’ date when, at no stage over the last three decades, has 
any Indigenous community or region been handed genuine self-determination. 
Rather, the implementation of self-determination by Australian governments over 
the last two decades has consisted more of a ‘dump and run’ exercise. Certain 
assets, resources and responsibilities have been handed over to community 
organisations. But at the same time, many government departments and  
non-government agencies have ‘vacated the field’, withdrawing staff and  
practical support. 
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The current position is that government funding and administrative 
arrangements impose major restrictions on the capacity for self-determination of 
Indigenous communities and their organisations (Australia Institute 2000; 
Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) 2001; Smith 2002b). Funds are:  
• administered by multiple departments which retain financial authority;  
• delivered in a stop-start process via a multitude of small separate grants;  
• subject to changing policy and externally controlled program priorities, 
inflexible conditions and timeframes; and  
• overloaded with heavy burdens of administrative and ‘upward’ accountability.  
This occurs in a context where a high degree of overlapping government juris-
diction over Indigenous program and service delivery exists alongside an 
entrenched resistance within governments and their departments to coordinate 
those functions. There is also a lack of transparency in government expenditure 
on Indigenous program funding (Arthur 1991; Australia Institute 2000; CGC 
2001; Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR) 1998; Smith 1992a, 1992b, 
2002b). Little by way of comprehensive financial authority, or self-governing 
powers, have been devolved to communities, and little sustained attention has 
been paid to building the governing institutions and capacities necessary for the 
effective implementation of self-determination. As a result, Indigenous community 
organisations are overwhelmed by the daily workload of implementing what could 
be called a ‘Claytons’ self-determination.5 In these circumstances, jurisdictional 
devolution could arguably constitute an effective and measured means to give 
practical content and meaning to self-determination policy.  
A trend towards greater devolution  
There is both a historical and a current Australian Indigenous demand for greater 
participation in the decision-making institutions of the state and for more 
autonomy in the form of devolved authority across a wide range of jurisdictions, 
including land ownership and management, health, welfare, economic 
development, law, and education. This demand is not cohesive, nor pan-
Australian, but it is a force, and in some areas it is growing more assertive and 
strategic (see Reynolds 1996, 1998).  
This trend parallels an international movement towards greater Indigenous self-
determination and self-governance through devolution (see Cornell et al. 2000; 
Havemann 1999; Hawkes 2001; Hicks & Dossett 2000; Hylton 1999; Ivison et al. 
2000). The Indigenous momentum is thus part of a widely recognised global trend 
towards the implementation by nation states of greater devolution and 
decentralisation; especially in respect to devolution of authority over jurisdictional 
matters to sub-systems within the state (Whiteford 2001; World Bank 1994).  
Devolution fits federated systems 
As a process of evolutionary change, devolution fits well into federal governance 
systems in general (see Hawkes 2001: 153–4; Kymlicka 2000; Young 2000), and 
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arguably also into Australia’s federal system. A key advantage of federalised 
jurisdictions lies in their diversity. Federalism allows for a greater voice at the 
local level, and greater choice (national governments are usually predisposed 
towards uniform policies), and it accommodates a diversity of identities and 
loyalties. Australian federalism has undergone a fundamental reshaping in recent 
years which has seen a growing emphasis on the advantages of collaborative 
diversity. As Martin Painter noted, ‘State and Commonwealth governments have 
found themselves, often against their immediate wishes, cooperating ever more 
closely on joint schemes of policy and administration’—and ‘doing so in new ways 
that … further entangle them in webs of financial and bureaucratic relations’ 
(1998: 1–2). In such a system, zones of Indigenous jurisdiction could become a 
recognised component, and this has been increasingly the case overseas (Fiscal 
Realities, Economists 2002; Hawkes 2001; IOG 1997, 1998; Johnson et al. 2000). 
In developing a model of modern governance for the USA that would be inclusive 
of Native American Indian rights and interests, Iris Young (2000) advocated the 
benefits of a ‘decentred diverse democratic federalism’. The model is partly based 
on the operation and early colonial influence of a traditional form of confederacy 
amongst the Iroquois Indian Nations which emphasised ‘the virtues of united 
strength that preserved a high level of local self-determination’ amongst member 
groups (2000: 241). Young’s model of decentred federalism draws partly upon the 
work of Frug (1999) and Nedelsky (1989) who have explored the notion of the 
‘relational self’ and ‘relational autonomy’ in constructions of citizenship, 
community-building and governance. As distinct from the ‘sovereign self’, the 
‘relational self’ is not an isolate, but constituted by interaction with others and 
their interdependencies. Instead of assuming that governance must be centred, 
bounded and unitary, the concept of the relational self poses the possibility that 
federal systems of governance can be decentred and accommodate inter- 
dependent layers: a ‘pooling of sovereignties—federal, state and Indigenous’ 
(Hawkes 2001: 154).  
Furthermore, as Young (2000) and Hawkes (2001) argue, there are ‘mutual 
traditions’ or analogues to western federal concepts and systems within the 
traditions of many Indigenous peoples. These comprise, for example, federalised 
Indigenous political organisations, and religious and economic alliances, which 
stress a structural balance between interdependence and autonomy. Arguably, 
the culturally-based principle of ‘autonomy and relatedness’ found amongst 
Indigenous Australians—a principle which is fundamental to the creation  
and reproduction of enduring Indigenous webs of social relations, economic 
exchange cycles, and ritual and political alliances—is an example of such a 
‘mutual tradition’.  
Within the Australian Indigenous domain there is a cultural preference, on the 
one hand, for autonomy, that is marked by a tendency towards localism and the 
value accorded to small kin-based congeries of people attached to core geographic 
locales. But this momentum towards ‘atomism’ and autonomy is balanced, on the 
other hand, by an equally compelling strain towards ‘collectivism’, connectedness 
and interdependence (Sutton 1995a). This brings small-scale groups together into 
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sometimes lasting, sometimes short-term confederacies that are formed on the 
basis of wider systems of cross-cutting territorial and reciprocal kin 
responsibilities and ritual alliances, and larger-scale political and economic 
networks (see Smith 1995; Sullivan 1995; Sutton 1995b).6 
The process of devolution within a system of decentred federalism aims to provide 
the constituent units or parts with more effective control over their own spheres 
of action, and influence over the determination of the conditions of local action. It 
is the case, however, that mutual traditions and behavioural norms need not be 
based on mutually acceptable value systems. To that extent, any framework for 
devolution will have to consider the applicability of universally accepted guiding 
principles for good governance (such as equity, fairness, flexibility, transparency, 
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness), to a design ‘fit’ with local and regional 
culturally-specific traditions (see discussion of various aspects of this issue in 
Cornell et al. 2000; Cornell & Taylor 2000; Martin 2002; Plumptre & Graham 
1999; Sterritt 2001). 
Building more effective community and regional governance 
Another argument for the benefits of devolution, which I increasingly receiving 
attention internationally, is cast in terms of the so-called ‘crisis of governability’ in 
centralised states, including the ‘growing dysfunction of state action’ (see Hawkes 
2001; Merrien 1998; Stoker 1998). Large jurisdictions obscure the linkages 
between authority and responsibility. They invariably claim authority, but their 
reach, in terms of administrative and communications capacity, exceeds their 
grasp, in terms of ability to implement. As a consequence, the state apparatus is 
criticised for losing touch with civil society, being unable to cope with regional 
policy and economic problems, and being unable to arbitrate between numerous 
competing demands (Merrien 1998; Plumptre & Graham 1999).  
By comparison, jurisdictional reportedly provides a mechanism for building better 
governance at the local and community levels. It promotes more direct 
participation of local constituents in decision-making. It enables more locally-
informed targeting of programs and policies, the establishment of more relevant 
governance structures and processes, and therefore the likelihood of more 
effective service delivery because of a  greater responsiveness to local preferences 
and circumstances. Devolved jurisdictions are also reported to be incubators for 
innovation, where local experimentation can be carried out and solutions adapted 
in ways not possible at more centralised (‘remote’) levels of government (Argy 
2001; Stoker 1998; World Bank 1994). 
Smaller jurisdictions shorten the number of connections between levels of 
accountability, and therefore link accountability more immediately to 
responsibility and consequences. They may also reduce unnecessary duplication 
resulting in better value for money; although there is usually a set of trade- 
offs between efficiency and equity at any jurisdictional level (Argy 2001;  
Whiteford 2001). 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 233 9 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Devolution has been shown to provide a way of community-building and of 
region-building (Cashaback 2001; Cornell et al. 2000, 2001; World Bank 1994). 
The call for greater devolution is part of renewed international interest in 
indigenous community development, and the spatial dimensions of socioeconomic 
disadvantage; what Kleinman (1998) calls the ‘new politics of place and poverty’ 
(see also Peters 1999). In Australia, the connection between Indigenous 
disadvantage, and population distribution across different geographic locations is 
well-documented, and solutions should be tailored accordingly (see CGC 2001; 
Taylor 1997). In order to maximise socioeconomic wellbeing in different locales, 
and more effectively respond to differences in local preferences, and disabilities 
conferred by geography, it may well be necessary to vary local governance 
structures and the coverage of devolved jurisdictions. 
Facilitating cohesive local political representation 
Devolution highlights the issue Weaver (1984) called ‘political representivity’, and 
is both cause and effect in new stages in the formation of Indigenous cultural and 
political identities. The federalist principle of ‘autonomy and relatedness’ arguably 
informs the ‘persistent and strong assertion of Indigenous interests via large-scale 
organisations’ (such as through regionally-based political, land rights and native 
title organisations, see Smith 1995: 66–7; Sullivan 1995) which Sutton (1995b) 
has referred to as the ‘new corporate tribes’. But a tidal wave of organisational 
incorporation has occurred in Indigenous communities over the last three 
decades. There is also a lack of national policy clarity, and under Australia’s self-
determination policy, several different structural levels of Indigenous 
representation have been funded (familial, organisational, community and 
regional). This has occurred in a haphazard and poorly coordinated manner. As a 
consequence, fiscal duplication and ineffective governance have been exacerbated 
on the ground. 
Today, there is a legally incorporated body for approximately every 100 
Indigenous people in the country. While there have been political and other 
advantages to incorporation, many Indigenous organisations have become silos of 
factional power within communities and regions, competing with each other for 
local legitimacy, scarce funds and staff. The results have more often been 
counterproductive than condusive to good community governance and 
accountable political representation. 
A systematic framework for jurisdictional devolution could facilitate a more 
integrated approach to Indigenous attempts to develop representative governance 
organisations from regional and community-based sets of interests.7 As part of 
that process, the existing organisational separatism within many communities 
would need to be structurally counterbalanced by the devolution of significant 
responsibility to a single community governance body, with accountability to all 
community members and authority over community development. This design 
principle also has implications for the generation of wider regional levels of 
jurisdictional representation across several communities. 
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At the same time, the Australian Indigenous tradition of diverse decentralised 
federalism suggests that no single corporate or cultural layer will suffice or be 
effective by itself as the sole structural unit for devolution. Rather, jurisdictional 
devolution will need to built upon identified layers or aggregations of 
responsibility and accountability—as it has been for the Australian federal system 
of government. 
Important groundwork for Indigenous self-determination via greater devolution 
has already been laid in some regions of Australia, particularly in local 
government and in the establishment of regional Indigenous service and 
representative organisations (see Arthur 2001; Nettheim et al. 2002; Sanders 
2002; Smith 1995; Westbury & Sanders 2000). It nevertheless remains the case 
that few Indigenous communities and their governing institutions are able to 
exercise comprehensive jurisdictional authority over many of the matters of most 
direct concern to them, because few levels of Australian government share their 
jurisdictional responsibilities and powers with Indigenous people.  
In summary 
There are significant political, cultural, economic and institutional advantages for 
many stakeholders that accrue to the process of jurisdictional devolution. Such a 
process would give a practical content to self-determination at the Indigenous 
community level. The extent to which these benefits can be secured, and perverse 
outcomes avoided, rests on factors operating at several levels. These will be 
explored below.  
The question now to be examined in more detail is, what would comprise a 
framework for jurisdictional devolution for Indigenous self-determination that 
would positively assist in securing such benefits, and what might it look like on 
the ground? There is a great deal to be learnt about design and implementation 
issues, and potential benefits and obstacles, by examining two devolution 
initiatives—one already in practice overseas, and another under negotiation  
in Australia. 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families: an overseas model 
for jurisdictional devolution of welfare 
In the USA, the self-determination policy as articulated in the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act 1975 and subsequent amendments 
and legislation, makes it possible for Indian Tribes to contract and compact with 
the Federal Government to directly manage federal programs. Recently, this 
process has expanded to include the devolution of federal welfare programs to 
both State and Tribal authorities via a new program called Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families (TANF), which replaces existing national welfare programs (US 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 2000). 
At the beginning of 2001, the Navajo Tribe signed a proclamation to establish the 
largest Indian-operated devolved TANF program in the country. With the DHHS 
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supplying $31.2 million and another $1 million coming from the State of New 
Mexico for office construction, the Federal Government, combined with the State 
Governments of Arizona, New Mexico and Utah turned over to the Navajo the 
various welfare payments and the raft of service delivery now known as TANF. 
The three State Governments kept their offices operating for six months while the 
Navajo Tribe hired and trained staff, and set up 12 offices to deliver the TANF 
program to an estimated 27,000 Navajo people. 
This is one of the latest in a series of tribally-run welfare programs that have been 
devolved since 1996 when President Clinton signed national welfare reform 
legislation known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). This legislation established a transparent process 
for devolving jurisdictional authority over key areas of federal welfare policy, 
funding and service delivery to State governments and to Tribes. It is part of a 
national welfare reform agenda that is designed to move welfare recipients in to 
work. It also amended the national Social Security Act (s. 412) to enable States 
and federally-recognised Indian Tribes, or consortia of such Tribes, to apply for 
block federal funding to directly design and operate their own welfare programs. 
Under the legislation, the Federal Government redirects to the Tribe an amount 
equal to that which would have been provided to the State for welfare services to 
all Indian families residing in proposed service area. The legislation also enables 
Tribes to enter into partnerships with State Governments to provide support 
services to Indian families. In parallel with the TANF initiative, federal funding 
was appropriated to the Native Employment Works (NEW) program to promote 
tribal work activities and create employment opportunities.  
Approval is based on the development and submission of a detailed Tribal TANF 
Plan, covering a three to four-year period and identifying its proposed service area 
and population, welfare policies and objectives, program guidelines and penalty 
regimes, welfare service to be provided, and an economic development plan to 
support access to employment. Each Tribal TANF Plan goes through an 
exhaustive federal assessment process, and must obtain Federal Government 
approval. Updated plans must be submitted every three years. To secure final 
approval, a Tribe has to have a governing body and capacity to administer the 
program; and a representative mandate from its constituents. 
Indian people participating in TANF for at least two years are required to 
participate in work activities. According to the latest report to Congress, Tribes 
enjoy ‘unprecedented flexibility’. Under the devolved program they have authority 
to use federal welfare funds in any manner that is reasonably calculated to 
accomplish the overall welfare agenda. A tribal governing body can deliver the 
program or outsource it, and determine program and eligibility criteria.8 It can 
also decide what form of benefits are appropriate for their population (e.g. Tribes 
have flexibility to provide assistance, including to TANF clients, in the form of 
cash, payments, food vouchers, clothing, shelter, utilities, household goods, 
personal care items, child-care, and transportation to work). What constitutes 
acceptable work (e.g. it may be defined to include culturally relevant work, job 
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search, subsidised employment, community service, vocational training and 
education), standards of work and participation requirements are in the hands of 
the Tribes. Tribes may define their own relevant concept of ‘family’ and ‘needy 
family’ (which may include extended-family, shared parenting) and determine the 
local support services that will be provided to members. By agreement with 
States, Tribes may also choose to include non-Indian families in their service 
area. Tribal approaches to these matters must be laid out in their initial plan 
(DHHS 2000).  
As a devolved jurisdiction transferring significant areas of authority, 
implementation of a Tribal TANF is nevertheless subject to a statutory framework 
which stipulates planning, approval and funding processes. New national 
regulations were also been passed in June 1999, covering requirements about the 
use of funds, program elements, and accountability, and specifying a cap on the 
amount of federal TANF funds that may be expended on administrative costs. 
Tribes are also subject to the same data collection and reporting requirements as 
State Governments. 
The early lessons from welfare devolution through TANF 
Not surprisingly, devolution of the TANF welfare program has highlighted a 
number of barriers and challenges. The welfare outcomes are dealt with in more 
detail in Daly and Smith (forthcoming). Here I will concentrate on the broader 
policy, structural and procedural issues that have arisen during the early 
implementation stage. 
The extent of devolution to Tribes 
A number of tribal groups have availed themselves of the opportunity to 
undertake devolved responsibility for welfare. As at the end of 2001, 34  
tribal entities (including individual tribal governments and consortia of  
Tribes) have taken over devolved responsibility for their own TANF programs. 
These cover more than 170 Tribes in 15 States (out of 330 federally- 
recognised Tribes and 12 Alaskan Regional Associations designated as eligible to 
administer the Tribal TANF program if they so choose) (Brown et al. 2001; Hicks 
& Dossett 2000).  
The 34 Tribal TANF programs assist a projected total of 17,000 Indian families 
per month out of a total of approximately 40,000 families; that is, at least one-
third (probably more) of all Indian families (DHHS 2000). The number of families 
served monthly ranges from eight to over 9,000. If all 38 pending plans are 
approved, it is estimated that Tribal TANFs will cover approximately half of all 
Indian families in the country. The 34 Tribal TANF programs were expected to 
draw down more than $86 million during the 2001 fiscal year (DHHS 2000). By 
the same year, a number of tribal groups were undertaking devolved 
responsibility for other related welfare functions.9 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 233 13 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
A flexible, culturally relevant program  
TANF is a young program, and as yet only a small number of field evaluations 
have been carried out. From research and Congress reports to date, it is clear 
that the Tribes have begun to take advantage of TANF’s flexibility to tailor welfare, 
employment and training programs to particular reservation populations, 
economies and social and cultural circumstances (Cornell et al. 2001). As a 
consequence, there is no standard Tribal TANF, but substantial variability in 
program design and implementation (Hillabrant & Rhoades 2001). For example, 
ten Tribal Plans allow for participation in traditional subsistence activities to 
count toward meeting an individual’s work requirement; seven count 
participation in substance abuse programs and violence counselling towards 
meeting their work requirement; only five have simply adopted the federal work 
activities requirements (DHHS 2000). 
Tribal TANF programs appear to have been able to deliver more comprehensive 
and more integrated welfare services on the ground, and it is reported that the 
local Tribal TANF offices are more accessible to tribal clients than are State offices 
located at greater distances from reservation populations. For example, the 
Tanana Chiefs Conference, a non-profit corporation serving tribes in interior 
Alaska, has used its TANF program to fund part-time workers in each of its 38 
isolated villages whose role is to help welfare recipients obtain benefits and 
support services (Brown et al. 2001: 2). Some tribal TANF programs have also 
adopted more flexible definitions of ‘family’ to accommodate extended kin 
relations and childcare arrangements, for example defining family to include 
‘caretaker relatives’ (Hicks 2001: 3). As a result, Indian people are attracted to 
tribally-run welfare programs, and the Tribal TANF caseload has been growing as 
people take themselves off the State rolls. 
A greater focus on Indian welfare characteristics 
Devolution has served to focus attention on, and analysis of, Indian welfare 
characteristics and, therefore, the specific needs of recipients in making the 
transition into work. Indian Tribes face significant challenges in implementing 
welfare reform. Many tribal communities suffer from disproportionate poverty 
rates, remote geographic locations and lack of access to mainstream services, 
high costs of delivery, lack of an economic base, inadequate training, and lack of 
facilities and infrastructure. 
Under the TANF in general, non-Indian caseloads in State-run programs have 
dropped dramatically. On average, welfare caseloads across the states have 
dropped by 50 per cent (DHHS 2000).10 The complexity of the Indian welfare 
picture has become more apparent. A recent study of a selection of Tribal TANF 
programs found that 64 per cent of Indian adults participate in some type of work 
activity. Of that total, only 11 per cent were working in unsubsidised 
employment, and a only small proportion of those were working full time. 
Approximately 33 per cent were undertaking job search and job readiness 
activities (DHHS 2000). In other words, Indian welfare caseloads are dropping in a 
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number of States, but not dropping as fast as non-Indian caseloads. And in some 
States and on some reservations, caseloads are actually rising as Indian welfare 
recipients choose to register in Tribal TANF programs (Brown 2001; Hillabrant & 
Rhoades 2001). 
There are a number of factors here, many of which involve demand and supply in 
respect to all long-term welfare recipients, rather than the process of devolution. 
As State welfare rolls are dropping, their remaining caseloads are becoming 
increasingly—and disproportionately—Indian (Hicks & Brown 2000: 4). That is, 
after the most able-to-work recipients have left the welfare rolls, the so-called 
‘hardest-to-serve’ recipients remain. A large proportion of the Indian TANF 
caseload are in this category: persons with low human capital endowments 
requiring specialised and intensive support, and placing exceptional demands on 
tribal staff and resources. As a consequence, in States with significant 
proportions of Indian residents, welfare is becoming more and more an Indian 
program, and Tribal TANF programs are assuming the major case management 
role with long-term welfare recipients, in adverse local economic circumstances 
(Burke 2001; Cornell et al. 2001).  
Jobs are scarce on Indian reservations (the average unemployment rate across all 
Indian reservations in 1999 was 43%; on some it was as high as 70–80%). Lack of 
access to child-care and transportation, substance abuse and mental health 
problems are reported as the top barriers (Brown 2001: 3; Hicks 2001). Much of 
the ‘work participation’ that people are moving into consists of subsidised work, 
work experience, education and training. Where people have been moving from 
welfare to work on tribal programs it has been generally to low-waged work, and 
they continue to need income support via TANF—as has been the case for many 
non-Indian TANF clients. This is not so much a problem of devolution, it is more 
of a broader economic issue. 
Devolution and the ‘work first’ policy 
The hallmark of mainstream welfare reform enacted via the USA Federal 
Government’s TANF program is ‘work first’; that is, the policy assumption is that 
with low job readiness but the right incentives and supports, American welfare 
recipients will find employment within a stipulated timeframe (and are required to 
do so). With the devolution of TANF to tribal groups, this approach has been 
shown to be impractical on Indian reserves where there is an enormous job gap 
and economic under-development (Cornell et al. 2001; Hillabrant & Rhoades 
2001: 56). Accordingly, many tribal TANF programs are supplementing ‘work first’ 
with education, training and supported work initiatives, and adapting program 
criteria to count these as active participation to fulfil TANF work activity criteria.  
More recent evaluations (Cornell et al. 2001; see also DHHS 2000: 5, 6–9) have 
argued that while ‘education first’ is an important strategy, it is a limited one, at 
best a holding position. Compared to all ethnic and minority groups on the 
welfare rolls within the USA, Indian Americans are in fact the best educated and 
have the highest participation rate in job preparation programs (Cornell et al. 
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2001: 6, 37).11 But education is unlikely to have significant impact on Indian 
welfare dependency given the scarcity of jobs on Indian reservations. Without 
jobs, education and training are of limited help to welfare recipients. Economic 
development and economic growth are the lynchpins for welfare reform and 
securing outcomes from TANF programs—whether they be Tribal or State, 
devolved or not (Cornell et al. 2001; Hicks & Brown 2000: 7). 
Program linkage and coordination issues 
The connections between TANF and other key employment, training and 
economic development programs are weak. Preliminary evaluations indicate that 
well-established linkages with other programs and agencies are critical to 
successful devolution (Hillabrant & Rhoades 2001). No single agency is likely to 
have the range of resources and expertise to address all issues and problems 
faced by Indian welfare recipients. It has become critical to match the needs of 
recipients with different agencies that can respond effectively and rapidly (Hicks 
2001; Hicks & Brown 2000). 
The Indian Employment, Training and Related Services Demonstration Act 1992 
(Known as ‘Public Law 102–477’) allows Tribes to combine the funds they receive 
for a variety of employment, training, education and related services from federal 
agencies (Brown 2001; Hicks 2001: 5; Hillabrant & Rhoades 2001: 30–31). An 
increasing number of Tribes have activated these ‘477 Programs’ to support 
jurisdictional devolution not only in respect to welfare programs but other related 
areas. These various programs can then be delivered through a single plan, a 
single budget and a single reporting system.  
There have been major advantages for Tribes in using this type of statutory 
mechanism to implement a workable form of devolution. The advantages include: 
• being able to co-locate services to provide welfare recipients with a one-stop 
shop, and to streamline eligibility processes and reporting burdens for 
different programs; 
• creating a larger integrated pool of funds for welfare, employment and training 
activities to support devolution; 
• allowing staff to be more easily be deployed across programs via the pooling of 
multiple funding sources; 
• reducing the number of funding sources for which expenditure needs to be 
accounted; 
• reducing referrals across programs, and enhancing access to available 
programs; and 
• reducing duplication of services. 
Changing the dynamics of State–Tribal relationships 
The devolution of TANF to States and to Tribes seems to be slowly changing the 
historic tensions in the relationship between them (DHHS 2002: 4; Hicks & 
Dossett 2000). The interests of both parties are converging as both now focus on 
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families and individual welfare recipients with substantial obstacles to gaining 
employment. Under a devolved TANF, States and Tribes have had to develop 
better communication processes and negotiate transfer arrangements. Tribes are 
finding that some States are becoming important sources of support and 
technical assistance on the ground to tribal staff (Begay 1999). Tribal TANFs are 
having to develop strong program linkages and referral arrangements with State 
agencies. And a number of Tribes have negotiated agreements with State 
Governments and county offices about service delivery procedures.  
A small number of Tribal TANFs have chosen to sub-contract delivery back to 
State service providers for different components of their programs. Some States, 
in turn, are increasingly using Tribal TANF officers to assist them to plan case 
management strategies and eligibility criteria for other Indian clients who remain 
on State caseloads. At the same time, early evaluations report a continuing 
legislative bias favouring State administration and funding arrangements at the 
expense of tribally devolved programs (Johnson et al. 2000; Hicks & Brown 2000). 
Also coordination is proving complex in cases where States lack an overall policy 
position on the range and extent of possible cooperation between their various 
departments and Tribal TANF offices. 
Economy of scale issues 
Small Tribes have faced problems with economies of scale in the welfare 
devolution process. Some have sought to mitigate these by forming consortia to 
provide services and share program operating costs and staff (Hillabrant & 
Rhoades 2001: 55). This is of particular benefit when the funds, client population 
numbers, established infrastructure and other resources are too small to enable a 
Tribe to operate a TANF of its own. These consortia have also enabled 
geographically discontinuous Tribes to administer a single devolved program. 
There were three multi-Tribal TANF operations at the beginning of 2001 (Brown 
2001: 7; DHHS 2000). One is an inter-Tribal consortium of 19 Tribes from 
southern California (known as the Californian Manpower Corporation), and the 
other two are Alaskan Regional Associations which serve a total of seven Alaskan 
native villages or Tribes. Several other tribal consortia are known to be actively 
exploring the option of operating TANF programs. The evidence to date suggests 
substantial tribal administrative and coordination capacity is required for 
consortia to be established and effectively maintained. 
Institutional capacity-building 
In the context of the historical lack of facilities and administrative infrastructure 
on many reservations, institutional capacity-building has been shown to be 
critical in devolving tribal social service provision (Pandey et al. 2000). Tribes are 
having to build offices, develop their own regulatory codes, reform their 
constitutions, and develop new governance arrangements and procedures for 
delivering the TANF program. Devolution has invariably required substantial 
strengthening of tribal financial and accounting systems, and other auditing and 
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record-keeping capacities. It has also highlighted the need for leaders and local 
staff who are capable of engineering the transition to more integrated and 
effective service provision (Cornell et al. 2001: 38). 
Technical support and data management 
The change from passive receipt of welfare benefits to devolved management has 
generated greater demand for information and technology to support 
administration and evaluation. Devolution has highlighted the dearth of accurate 
data on Indian populations (by tribal affiliation) at the State level, including 
amongst Tribal organisations. Tribes generally lack the information resources, 
trained statistical staff, and infrastructure to administer welfare information 
systems of the quality that State and Federal Governments posess (Brown 2001; 
Hicks & Brown 2000: 10).  
As a result, devolution has encouraged increased agreement-making about 
communication procedures, technical support, and data management with State 
and Federal agencies. For example, the Navajo Nation TANF is testing a 
customised electronic case management and tracking system that links case 
workers from its 12 welfare offices by satellite so they can coordinate the 
determination of eligibility for TANF, child support, child care and general 
assistance welfare services. The system is also designed to be compatible with 
State TANF data collection systems, so that information can be shared between 
the Tribe and States (Brown 2001: 4). Another Tribal TANF in Oregon uses the 
State’s computer system for its case management, for the issuing of grants, and 
for data collection and reporting activities (Brown 2001: 6). 
The adequacy of funding 
Currently, Tribal communities incur proportionately heavier financial burdens 
than do States in operating devolved TANF programs. Devolved program funding 
between States and Tribes is not equalised to take into account the fact that 
Tribal TANF programs serve long-term welfare recipients who face major 
impediments to transferring to work.  
Approximately 71 per cent of Tribes receive State matching funds; the remainder 
are receiving significantly less funds than States received in order to carry out the 
same level of welfare services to the same kinds of welfare recipients (Brown et al. 
2001). Tribes also receive their funding base on a formula that differs from that 
applied to State-run TANF programs—and they are locked into the 1994 
population numbers provided by States for their Indian welfare clients (Hicks 
2001; Hicks & Brown 2000: 6–8, 10; Hillabrant & Rhoades 2001).  
There is a lack of federal funding for tribal program start-up—a significant hurdle 
given the historical gaps in reservation infrastructure and the high early costs of 
program establishment. This disadvantages smaller, less well-off tribal 
communities, and requires others to subsidise program costs with tribal 
resources. For example, the Navajo Tribe appropriated approximately $1.5 million 
from its own tribal revenues to offset the start-up costs of TANF administration, 
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planning and information systems (Brown et al. 2001: 2). By comparison, States 
have received federal welfare program funding and infrastructure support, 
building up over the last 60 years.  
An additional financial disadvantage for Tribes is that they do not receive the 
same bonuses offered to States for reducing welfare caseloads, and are not 
eligible (as States are) for funds to evaluate their programs. The National 
Congress of American Indians (NCAI) has noted that insufficient funding for the 
program has prevented some Tribes from initiating their own TANF programs 
(Hicks 2001; Hicks & Brown 2000; Hicks & Dossett 2000). 
Implications of TANF for an Australian framework for 
jurisdictional devolution 
Recognising the historical, cultural, legislative and policy differences between the 
two countries, a number of potentially valuable lessons for Australia can be 
extrapolated from the TANF devolution process in the USA. The TANF experience 
highlights the importance of the following factors in the successful design and 
implementation of any process of jurisdictional devolution: 
• a national legislative and policy framework to support the devolution process; 
• national regulations to promote shared program benchmarks, equity, and 
administrative standards; 
• a statutory basis for program coordination and fund pooling across several 
program areas, 
• adequate baseline funding for planning, and for the set-up phase, 
infrastructure catch-up, administration, technical support and program 
evaluation; 
• realistic timeframes for the initial planning stage and start-up; 
• an incremental implementation that is subject to periodic evaluation and 
reporting requirements; 
• flexible coordination and agreement-making mechanisms between Indigenous 
groups and State Governments and their departments; 
• the development of local-level data collection, management and reporting 
systems; 
• the potentially significant role of State and Federal Governments in providing 
technical assistance and data-sharing to Indigenous groups; 
• the use of consortia arrangements to achieve economies of scale and enable 
small Indigenous populations to maximise the benefits of sharing 
administrative, funding and other resources; and 
• institutional and governance capacity-building at the local level. 
Whatever the jurisdictional domain involved, the design and implementation of a 
devolution process in Australia will need to address many of the broad problems 
and challenges highlighted by the American TANF experience. But there will also 
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be important differences. One of the most critical matters to be addressed is what 
might be the most appropriate units and boundaries in Australia for devolution at 
the local level, and what forms of power-sharing and authority might be involved. 
Answers to those questions will have spatial, cultural, political and social 
components, some of which are discussed below. 
A Central Australian community proposal for devolution of 
welfare 
A recent welfare initiative taken by one Indigenous community in central 
Australia provides the opportunity to consider what the design components  
and principles of a model for jurisdictional devolution might be. It also high- 
lights a number of the issues raised by the USA TANF devolution experience, 
allowing the development of a relevant framework and practical strategies for 
Australian circumstances.  
The policy background 
Australia continues to operate a highly centralised social security system that 
reportedly has a high level of efficiency, but a weak level of response to local 
service issues (Whiteford 2001: 118). A number of recent government inquiries 
have sought to address the inadequacies of this model, including in its 
application to Indigenous Australians. In 2000, the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs (HRSCFCA) recommended 
in its published report Health is Life (2000), that where Indigenous communities 
wished to volunteer to manage welfare payments and services: ‘[t]he 
Commonwealth [should] facilitate innovative models of income support and 
funding to Indigenous communities’ (HRSCFCA 2000: 33). 
The Committee endorsed the need for the pooling of Indigenous health funds at a 
regional level, and the need for additional weighting to be given to cover the 
higher costs of servicing remote communities. It argued that communities should 
be supported to take responsibility for determining the use of pool funds in 
delivering health services to their community members. 
In its response to the McClure (2000) welfare reform Report in late 2000, the 
Federal Government announced that: 
A fundamentally new approach is needed to increase the social and economic 
participation of Indigenous people … Under this approach, community-based 
providers of welfare services … will have a key role in the whole gamut of welfare 
reform—policy advice, programme design, programme implementation and service 
delivery (Commonwealth of Australia 2000: 8, 10–11). 
At the same time, an Indigenous Families and Communities Roundtable was 
convened by the Commonwealth Minister for Family and Community Services 
with a brief to consider solutions for Indigenous welfare and economic 
development. The first Roundtable meeting in 2000 stated in a government media 
release that:  
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Programmes should be based on the views and aspirations of whole communities 
and Indigenous people themselves should have a central role in the design, planning 
and delivery of services (Commonwealth Minister for Family and Community 
Services, 24 October 2000). 
A small number of research and applied projects have recently considered the 
factors involved in Indigenous welfare dependence, and have made 
recommendations, consistent with these policy objectives, for greater Indigenous 
participation, more culturally relevant service delivery, and local community 
control in welfare service delivery (see Pearson 2000; Sanders 1999; Smith 2000, 
2002a). The unresolved issue of devolution lies at the heart of several initiatives 
arising from the welfare reform process. However, there is little public reporting or 
evaluation available; one recent proposal has been documented (see HREOC 
2002: 79–91; Smith 2002a). 
An agreement over coordination and pooling of block funding 
In 2001, the Indigenous Council members of a central Australian community, 
together with the Council’s Chief Executive Officer, attempted to address this 
government policy about welfare reform. They put forward a practical proposal to 
devolve to the community and its Council particular areas of authority and 
funding for a small subsection of identified components of welfare, policy and 
administration. The proposal was to be fleshed out under the umbrella of a formal 
Community Participation Agreement with Government, through a newly 
established program to be administered by ATSIC.12  
As a preliminary step, the Council proposed that the relevant welfare funding, 
currently being administered by several separate departments, should be pooled 
into what the community called ‘one bucket’—that is, into one multi-year 
allocation, delivered down to the community via a single channel, subject to a 
single application and acquittal process, and using a negotiated set of evaluation 
indicators relevant at the community level (see Fig. 1).  
Delegation of authority and incremental implementation 
Council members, staff and resident families were aware of the severity of 
problems they would have to address in their own community. These included 
low levels of education, major health problems, high reliance on welfare 
payments, poorly defined governing institutions and responsibilities, and 
underdeveloped governance capacities. But the community was adamant about 
their desire to address the debilitating effects on families of welfare dependence 
and other entrenched problems. Accordingly, they wanted a measured, 
incremental transfer of authority, in the process of which they would work closely 
with the Federal Government, ATSIC, Centrelink, the Department of Family and 
Community Services (DFACS) and other departments, to build up the local 
governance, financial and administrative capacities that would be needed.  
The Council proposal requested that the community be given a formally delegated 
authority under the Social Security Act 1999 to undertake the devolved functions. 
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This delegation would have established an umbrella not only for its legal role, but 
also for transparently regulating its responsibilities to community members.  
Fig. 1. The proposed flow of identified welfare funding to the community 
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departments to assist them in the development of community-based appeals and 
redress processes and structures. 
The community identified a number of major forms of ongoing support and action 
that be needed at different levels, in order for a planned, incremental transfer of 
authority to occur (see Smith 2002a for details). Several of these resonate with 
issues identified as critical to devolution success in the USA TANF process. They 
included:  
• a devolved community gateway for welfare participation and local program 
administration; 
• a devolved delegation to the community under the Social Security Act 1999; 
• a consolidated block of relevant program funding and acquittal package; 
• creation and administration of a Community welfare and work Participation 
Program; 
• the development and negotiation of Individual Participation Agreements;  
• funding and support for development of a menu of community defined 
participation activities; 
• community case-managed intensive assistance and support to community 
residents; 
• provision of coordinated program training and supervision;  
• community-based enforcement and appeal procedures, developed over time 
and in partnership with Centrelink and DFACS;  
• program infrastructure development and support in the form of a Community 
Transaction Centre and networked IT;  
• the reforming of community governance structures and the establishment of a 
related capacity-building program; 
• the forging of local participation partnerships via agreements; 
• national coordination and partnerships mechanisms; 
• development of community data and communication systems for 
management, reporting and ongoing evaluation process; and 
• development of enhanced community financial management systems, and 
access to financial literacy, planning and banking services. 
Implications for jurisdictional devolution in Australia 
In 2002, the Community Council is no closer to a negotiated agreement. Given 
the extent of difficulties recognised within the community, it is ironic that it has 
been departmental turf wars in Canberra, a national policy void in respect to 
implementation of  community agreements that include forms of devolution, and 
bureaucratic resistance, that have effectively stalled this preliminary proposal. 
The political response to the community proposal highlights the still unresolved 
tensions within Indigenous affairs between centralised bureaucratic control, and 
the desire for greater devolution and decentralisation. In such circumstances, 
when there is conflict over alternative policy proposals (centralisation versus 
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devolution), they tend to be evaluated by those in the bureaucracy on the basis of 
the extent to which proposals require an alteration in State and bureaucratic 
power positions. Not surprisingly, the outcome favoured at those levels is that 
which least disrupts the existing balance of power between Indigenous 
Australians and the state. 
Nevertheless, the community proposal, with its emphasis on: 
• the principle of legally devolved policy, financial and administrative authority 
to a representative community governing body; 
• locally-relevant principles of individual and collective rights and equity; 
• developing a realistic timetable for a supported and incremental transition; 
• actively working in partnership with government, public service departments 
and the private sector to design and implement the model; in tandem with  
• a comprehensive program of community capacity and institution building 
stands as a model of the framework necessary for incremental jurisdictional 
devolution at the community level. The mechanism for securing such authority 
via a negotiated agreement also stands as an effective approach.  
The community as the foundation for dispersed Indigenous 
self-determination 
How might these lessons and principles be translated into a workable framework 
for devolution that is transferable at the local level? In the absence of what Bern 
and Dodds (2000: 164) have termed ‘a compelling model of political 
representation’ in Indigenous Australia, there continues to be heated debate 
amongst policy makers and Indigenous people about the ‘self’ in self-
determination. Suggestions range from individuals, to their extended families, 
through to tribal and clan groupings; local communities; regional geographic 
areas and regional organisations. All these different layers have been developed 
and funded in Australia, but in a haphazard and poorly coordinated manner. As a 
consequence, competing representative voices, duplication of services, program 
ineffectiveness and arguably, barriers to self-determination have been multiplied 
on the ground. 
For many reasons, Indigenous communities are a logical starting point—the 
building blocks—for thinking about the boundaries and layerings of jurisdictional 
devolution, both vertically and horizontally. Higher-order regional levels of 
jurisdictional authority are likely not to be sustainable unless community 
governance structures and processes are in reasonable order. Problems arise for 
regionally-based organisations when they lose sight of the fact that their ongoing 
cultural legitimacy and regional mandates are grounded, first and foremost, at 
the community level. The smaller satellite communities and outstations 
surrounding larger ‘hub’ communities will flounder unless effective governance 
and other services are delivered down to them. Many larger communities have 
become the focal point for local service delivery by governments, and for economic 
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development initiatives. And a majority now have a legally incorporated Council 
or other governing body operating under community constitutions, performing a 
range of representative functions on behalf of their residents. 
There are probably as many definitions of an Indigenous community as there are 
communities in Australia. A number are artificial constructions of the colonial 
process and are culturally heterogeneous. They contain traditional landowners as 
well as other Indigenous and non-Indigenous residents, all attempting to 
negotiate different rights and interests. But they have also become, as Frances 
Peters-Little (2000) writes ‘an integral part of … people’s heritage and are 
fundamental to Aboriginality’. Many Indigenous people have come to identify their 
family and personal histories, and their economic wellbeing and political 
affiliations with particular communities and the wider cultural networks in which 
those communities are located. But defining the type, size and location of 
communities constitutes an important issue for developing a workable form of 
jurisdictional devolution.  
The limits to localism? 
According to 1999 Community Housing and Infrastructure Needs Survey (CHINS) 
data, there are approximately 1,300 discrete Indigenous communities in 
Australia. Of these, 80 are located within larger non-Indigenous population 
centres and the remainder are geographically separate from other population 
centres. Only 149 have a population of 200 people or more (there are only 30 
discrete communities in Australia with populations over 500 people). The 
majority—close to 80 per cent—have populations of less than 50 people. 
Approximately one-third of Indigenous Australians live in remote or very remote 
locations in these discrete communities. The remainder are scattered within 
urban and metropolitan locations, where there are what could be called 
Indigenous ‘communities of interest’ (see Peters 1999: 412). These urbanised 
communities of interest retain strong cultural and historical identities, but are 
often without a traditional land base.  
The idea that there is an ideal size for Indigenous governance has been 
demonstrated to be a chimera by both the USA TANF process described above, 
and by the extensive research of the Canadian Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
self-governance and self-determination (see IOG 1997, 2000; Peters 1999). 
Nevertheless, there are important scale and aggregation factors that do have to be 
considered. An important question for the issue of devolution in Australia is 
whether all these communities will want to, or should be, the focus for 
jurisdictional devolution. For example, do the 942 Indigenous communities with 
populations of less than 50 want to have their own separate governing structures 
and administrative processes, separate financial management systems, direct 
funding allocations, and service delivery responsibilities? Is this a viable degree of 
local separatism for implementing devolution on the ground?  
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Arguments for devolution are arguably greatest where Indigenous people are 
concentrated geographically (Hawkes 2001: 156). But these situations do not 
exhaust the possibilities for jurisdictional devolution. Other types of dispersed 
Indigenous communities (e.g. those dispersed in rural areas, settled across 
different townships, or scattered in metropolitan neighbourhoods) have 
demonstrated the desire for a devolved jurisdiction that is based on a governing 
body representing a membership which is not territorially defined. Even then, 
however, the question of economies of scale will need to be addressed. The 
Canadian Royal Commission argued that some First Nation communities were too 
small to effectively exercise the jurisdictions they hoped to assume (IOG 2000: 1) 
and various approaches have been proposed to address problems concerning 
economies of scale (K. Graham 1999; IOG 2000; Peters 1999). 
Availability of funds and resources will clearly set  limits to devolution, and so too 
will governance capacity and effectiveness. Such ‘limits to localism’ have already 
been recognised in the historical development and funding of the outstation 
movement in Australia, where the trend has been for smaller outstations to 
aggregate themselves around a larger ‘hub’ community for the purposes of 
securing service delivery and administration.  
Towards a model for jurisdictional devolution: regionally 
dispersed, layered community governance 
The history of Australian Indigenous political development to date has been 
strongly influenced by a cultural preference for a federalist principle of ‘connected 
localism’ (what has been called ‘relational autonomy’ by Nedelsky 1989)). This 
suggests that no single ‘self’ will suffice by itself as the local unit of devolution. 
Rather, devolution will be best realised by creating interlocked layers or 
aggregations, with corresponding distributions of responsibility and 
accountability.  
Aggregation is a mechanism which could potentially address these keys issues of 
culture, demography and administrative scale. Aggregation is a process of 
assembling or ‘scaling up’ by the collection of particulars into a mass or sum, 
which it is then possible to consider as a whole or collectively. Aggregation is 
sufficiently justifiable whenever units are sufficiently independent and similar.  
One potential model for implementing this approach to jurisdictional devolution 
at the local level is based on regionally-dispersed, layered community governance. 
This is not a new idea—aspects of such a model have been explored by 
researchers (see e.g. Arthur 2001; Rowse 1998; Sanders & Arthur 2001; Smith 
1995; Sullivan 1995; Westbury & Sanders 2000), and in various program and 
policy initiatives. Under this model, the ‘scaling up’ of jurisdictions—expanding 
their reach and linkages—can be achieved by a process of aggregation. Local 
community jurisdiction would remain in place, but specific areas of authority and 
responsibility could be delegated to governance layers of greater collective scope. 
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Such a model focuses on the key role of major ‘hub’ communities as the 
foundation stones for establishing representative community governance 
structures with authority to administer agreed areas of jurisdictional authority. 
These major communities could also act as the starting point for aggregation at 
the sub-community and regional levels. For example, they could deliver services 
and resources downwards to the ‘spokes’ of surrounding smaller satellite 
communities. Satellite communities will undoubtedly want to retain a level of 
autonomous decision-making and daily management; but will be more effectively 
serviced by governance structures and infrastructure that are more ‘centrally’ 
located at hub communities. In other words, different community layers would 
undertake activities and responsibilities commensurate with capacity, efficiency 
and culturally-based local alliances.  
Communities do not operate in isolation; they are part of wider regional cultural 
and economic networks. From hub communities, jurisdictional responsibilities 
and distributed accountability could also be dispersed ‘upwards’ to regional 
Indigenous organisations. These could deliver agreed services (e.g. coordinated 
services in areas such as health, housing, financial management, banking, 
employment recruitment, infrastructure delivery and maintenance).  
One can envisage that regional levels of jurisdiction might develop if ‘regional 
districts’ are created by consortia of communities cooperating for wider purposes 
(e.g. for regional land management, for large-scale economic development 
projects, capital investment, or the development of region-wide conservation or 
heritage protection standards) (see also Cashaback 2001). Such evolving regional 
districts would form a sounder basis for the development of regional authorities 
or levels of governance. 
There are several advantages to this model of aggregation for the purposes of 
jurisdictional devolution. It responds to the culturally-based preference for both 
local autonomy and wider forms of collective interdependence, and is premised on 
flexibility, where local and regional aggregations could arise out of shared 
cultural, social, economic and political strategies and networks. The model 
emphasises a ‘whole of community’ approach to political representativeness and 
has ‘soft boundaries’ adaptable to changing circumstances in communities  
and regions.  
A particular advantage of the model is that it distributes different forms and 
degrees of accountability across layers, thereby spreading the workload entailed 
in devolution, and enables ‘two-way’ accountability to be reinforced (i.e. internal 
or vertical accountability to Indigenous constituents at different structural levels, 
and external or horizontal accountability across to public and private sector 
institutions and levels of government) (see J. Graham 1999; Martin & Finlayson 
1996; Nicoll 1997). Accountability assumes the existence of reciprocal obligations, 
an exchange that is akin to an agreement (Nicoll 1997: 6). Dispersed, or layered 
accountability is similarly premised on the idea of a two-way process, but 
recognises that there are varying degrees of accountability and accountability to 
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different stakeholders. Dispersed, mutual accountability is already a feature of 
Australian federalism, as it is of Indigenous society. 
The model also addresses economies of scale via the possibility of aggregation, 
recognises that there are different types of communities (including specific locales 
and dispersed ‘communities of interest’). Importantly, it builds upon historical 
and political trends already established as a result of Indigenous initiatives on  
the ground. 
Conclusion 
A decade ago the RCIADIC (1991 Vol. 2: 503) noted with some insight that: ‘It is 
remarkable how a concept [i.e. self-determination] which is so widely recognised 
as being central to the achievement of the profound change which is required in 
the area of Aboriginal affairs remains so ephemeral and so difficult to define’. 
Governments, it noted ‘can genuinely believe that their policies give practical 
recognition to self-determination, and yet in the eyes of Aboriginal people the 
policies fail to do so’. This paper has argued that in Australia, self-determination 
can be better defined and effectively secured through a framework for 
jurisdictional devolution. Such a framework provides us with a policy-relevant 
language and strategies for the practical implementation of self-determination.  
Importantly, the framework of jurisdictional devolution also heeds the advice 
proffered by the RCIADIC; namely, that the most appropriate solutions will be 
found by looking ‘at what Aboriginal people and their organisations are actually 
doing and how they, in fact, relate to the broader society in order to gain an 
insight into the sense of self-determination which is the aspiration of most 
Aboriginal people’ (RCIADIC 1991 Vol. 2: 509). The history of Indigenous action 
and initiatives overwhelmingly stresses the desire to secure greater local authority 
and control. In one form or another, Indigenous Australians have been fighting for 
jurisdictional devolution for a very long time. But the experience in Australia to 
date, and useful lessons available from overseas, suggest that a number of key 
areas of support and action will need to be in place, or under concurrent 
development, if effective and relevant forms of devolution are to be designed. 
Jurisdictional devolution arrangements will be diverse on the ground, but this 
does not mean that each community must entirely reinvent the wheel when 
thinking about devolution. There is a wealth of relevant local, national and 
international experience that can be drawn upon, including universally accepted 
design principles that will need to be addressed. These include the need for 
financial and administrative transparency, equity and fairness of funding 
arrangements, certainty of devolved authority, clearly defined responsibilities, 
participatory and consensus-based community devolution processes, flexibility 
and choice, dispersed vertical and horizontal accountability, efficiency and 
effectiveness, cultural legitimacy and mandate, sustainable leadership, and an 
alignment of responsibilities with capacity. 
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Securing beneficial outcomes from devolution will be linked to achieving a design 
match between strategy and structures. New models, or the adaptation of existing 
models of community and regional governance, will need to be considered. This 
paper suggests the value of a broad framework based on a model of aggregation, 
focusing on regionally dispersed, layered community governance, and 
jurisdictional devolution to major ‘hub’ communities. 
Devolution is not only about the transfer of power, it is also about the transfer of 
resources. Jurisdictional devolution will require access to, and authority over a 
range of financial, social, cultural and natural resources—in other words, more 
than just money. A fiscal framework will need to underwrite the process, which 
identifies: 
• the equitable division and allocation of block financial transfers to the local 
level;  
• the division of expenditure responsibilities and accountability; and 
• agreed areas of financial authority. 
Devolution will require a degree of consensus about the basic units of 
representation, and mechanisms for promoting those units. For this to occur 
there is a need for an  Indigenous political culture that will support the capacity 
of communities and regions to handle the transfer of powers involved. A level of 
Indigenous institutional development will be required, including local governance 
structures and procedures capable of effective representation and accountability, 
and of administering additional authority. For these to be developed, an 
Indigenous ‘civil society’ is needed at the local and regional level to support the 
transfer of power with ongoing mandates; and to determine the specific form of 
devolution. Local leaderships who can mobilise constituents to provide mandates, 
who are widely seen to be representative, and who can give direction to the 
transfer process will be critical. 
The Australian and American case studies indicate that a staged uptake of 
jurisdictional authority is best. Devolution is a step-by-step process in which 
‘authority is conferred in incremental tranches as local competencies in 
management and responsibility are progressively demonstrated’ (IUCN 2001: 2). 
These competencies do not arise out of thin air: a systematic program of capacity 
building will need to be carried out in communities in parallel to systematic 
planning and start-up phases. 
Concrete action and commitment will be needed at all government levels to 
progress the design and implementation of jurisdictional devolution, including 
statutory, policy and regulatory frameworks. A commitment by higher orders of 
government and bureaucracy to the process will be critical, as will a forum within 
which to progress negotiated agreements about power-sharing and coordination. 
This suggests a need for two processes of devolution: one from the bottom up, 
and the other from the top down.  
The reality is that jurisdictional devolution in Australia will be a process of 
particular complexity because the challenge will be to create a ‘space’ for new 
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kinds of Indigenous authority within zones of jurisdiction already occupied by 
Federal, State, and Local Governments. But the self-determination policy, as it is 
presently constituted and implemented, is not working well in Indigenous affairs. 
While communities have been handed increased responsibility for service delivery, 
and are subject to greater scrutiny of their financial accountability to government, 
very little genuine jurisdictional authority has actually been devolved to them. 
Without these areas of authority and capacity, community governance and 
institutional development will continue to be substantively defective, and the self-
determination policy could well become as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
People in Canada suggested (RCAP 1996, Vol. 2 (2): 755), an exercise in ‘illusion 
and futility’. 
 
Notes 
1.  These are summarised in discussions in Australia Institute (2000: Appendix 2) and 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) (2002). 
2.  See the Macquarie Dictionary (2nd edn, 1991) and the ‘Lectric Law Lexicon’ at the 
website [www.lectlaw.com/rotu.html]. 
3. In Mabo v Queensland No. 2 the High Court rejected the historical legal fiction of 
terra nullius and found that native title was not extinguished by the British 
acquisition of sovereignty. The majority ruling in Mabo emphasised the existence of 
Aboriginal law and custom as the foundation of entitlement (see also Pearson 1997). 
In the Australian High Court case of Yanner v Eaton (1999) 73 ALJR 1518, the court 
recognised the right to exercise a native title exploitation of wildlife without an 
appropriate authority being obtained under relevant state legislation. In the case of 
NT of Australia Court of Summary Jurisdiction, Police & J.G. Yunipingu No. 9709243 
(1998, Transcript (DPP Reference No. 1, (2000) 134 NTR 1) (see also Bastern 2001), 
the defendant applied reasonable force, in accordance with Aboriginal law governing 
traditional ownership of land, to punish an act by a non-Aboriginal on that land, 
that was deemed by the defendant to be wrongful under Aboriginal law. The 
magistrate recognised ‘the rights of the defendant [a Yolngu man] to enforce Yolngu 
law on Yolngu land’ and stated that under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976 ‘The land is deeded so that Aboriginal people may pursue … 
traditional lives which means, amongst other things, an observance of and the 
administration of the Aboriginal law applicable to the area where they live’ (1998: 
16). 
4. As opposed to the formation of ‘an independent, internationally recognised state with 
ultimate authority [or sovereignty] over all matters within a determinately bounded 
territory’ (Young 2000: 252). 
5. ‘Claytons’ is the brand name for an Australian beer which has a low alcohol content—
a ‘half strength’ beer advertised as ‘the drink you have when you’re not having a 
drink’. The term has become more widely applied by Australians—to the extent that it 
is now listed in the Macquarie Dictionary (2nd edn, 1991)—to refer to any action, 
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commodity or process which is negatively characterised as being a poor-quality 
substitute or imitation, not ‘the genuine thing’. 
6. A confederacy is simply an alliance of persons, parties or states for some common 
purpose; a group of persons, parties etc. united by a common alliance (Macquarie 
Dictionary, 2nd edn, 1991). 
7. For a more detailed consideration of the role of incorporated organisations as a 
mechanism for self-determination and regional autonomy, see Arthur (2001) and 
Sanders (2002). 
8. For example, under s. 408 of the Social Security Act as amended by PRWORA, any 
month in which a TANF recipient spends in Indian country where 50% or more of all 
adults are not employed, does not count toward the applicable time limit for TANF 
assistance. There has been criticism that even this cut-off point is too high, given 
that the majority of reservation populations have unemployment levels between 38% 
and 45%. 
9. In 2001, 257 tribal childcare grantees serving more than 500 tribes received $90 
million in federal Childcare and Development Block Grants; 5 tribes were operating 
their own Child Support Enforcement programs; 78 tribal grantees administered $15 
million in Welfare-to-Work grants to support employment opportunities under TANF 
(Brown et al. 2001: 2).  
10. Beyond those figures the picture is less clear, with recent evaluations suggesting 
that only 35–40% of former welfare recipients are employed for the entire year after 
they leave welfare, that wages are low and tend to remain low, that welfare recipients 
are becoming the working poor, and that the decline in child poverty has not kept 
pace with the decline in caseloads (Brown et al. 2001). The outcomes are causing 
many involved to start redefining the problem of ‘welfare’ to include the problem of 
the ‘working poor’. 
11. A ten-year study of poverty, welfare reliance and economic development on one 
Indian reservation reported that job opportunities had not increased at a rate that 
accommodated the rising number of educated Indians living there. Approximately 
one in five heads of households had at least four years of college but still remained 
below the poverty line (Antell et al. 2002). 
12. In the July 2001 Budget, the Federal Government announced that it would allocate 
$32 million over four years to ATSIC to assist potentially 100 communities to 
‘develop and manage’ the Agreements and ‘plan for better service delivery at the local 
level’. The funding includes ATSIC support for related activities such as ‘leadership, 
strengthening culture and community governance’. Each Agreement ‘will involve the 
community in identifying practical ways people can contribute to their families and 
communities in return for their income support’. In practice, ATSIC is expected to 
‘coordinate each stage of the design of the Community Participation Agreements 
through negotiation with the communities and key agencies’ (Smith 2002a). 
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